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CORPORATE LAW .A.S A FACILITATOR OF 
SELF GOVERNANCE 
Edward Rock* and Michael Wachter .. 
A few years ago, we began working on a series of articles that 
brought together our separate research agendas. We found a 
natural resemblance between two seemingly different approaches. 
One of us, Professor Edward Rock, has argued that a distinctive 
quality of Delaware fiduciary duty law is that it fits poorly into a 
rule-oriented approach. 1 Instead, Professor Rock argued, one should 
think of fiduciary duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort 
managers to consummate performance and that criticize those who 
perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no 
direct legal sanction is imposed. 2 The conclusion was the message 
that "legal sanctions were little more than place-holders for the 
accumulation of the messages." 3 
Professor Michael Wachter, working jointly with others, had 
argued that inside the firm the actors protect the integrity of their 
relationships on their own, eschewing the protections of legal 
sanctions. Rather than relying on costly contract-writing that would 
be enforced by third parties, the actors adopt arrangements that are 
self-enforcing. Tied to the theory of the firm, one lesson was that 
the relationships that are brought inside the firm are precisely those 
relationships that are less expensively governed by self-enforcing 
arrangements. 4 
• Professor of Law and co-director of the Institute for Law and Economics, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
•• William B .• Johnson Professor of Law and Economics and co-director of the Institute 
for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania. 
1 Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997). 
2 Id. at 1015. 
3 Id. at 1016. 
4 E.g., Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor 
Markets, 29 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 240 (1990), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (D.J.B. Mitchell & M.A. Zaidi eds., 1990); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELLJ. 
ECON. 250 (1970), reprinted in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM (L. Putterman & R.S. 
Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
529 
530 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:529 
In retrospect, those articles were part of a different discussion. 
They were an attempt to understand the role of non-legally enforced 
norms in corporate law on the one hand and in employment 
relationships in the firm on the other .5 The resemblance between 
our previously distinct lines of research runs deep. In a series of 
joint papers, we have considered the relationship between law and 
norms in corporation law, and recently we have developed a more 
general theory that brings together corporation law and the theory 
of the firm. 6 In this Essay, we outline briefly this general theory, 
which we are developing in more detail elsewhere, and discuss how 
embracing this approach would affect the way one teaches the basic 
Corporations course. 7 In this general theory, we try to bring 
together property rights and transaction cost theories of the firm 
with the norms literature to recast our understanding of the 
fundamental structure of corporate law. 
We begin with what we consider to be the standard view. In the 
standard approach, one tells one's students that the corporate form 
has four characteristics: limited liability for investors, free transfer-
ability of investments, legal personality, and centralized manage-
ment. This ordering of the characteristics, more often than not, 
conveys their relative importance. If one views the corporation as 
a nexus of contracts, the shareholder/firm nexus is the focus of 
corporation law. Limited liability, free transferability, and to a 
lesser extent, legal personality, establish the contours of the 
shareholders' "contract" with the firm. The design of corporation 
law is then to minimize both the agency costs between shareholders 
and managers, by bringing their interests into alignment, and the 
collective action problems that arise when shares are widely held 
5 In 1996, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review devoted an entire symposium to 
the subject "Law, Economics, & Norms." Symposium, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1643-2339 
(1996). 
6 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific 
Assets and Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999); Edward 
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit Between Employees 
and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNAL"'CE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark 
J. Roe eds. , 1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and 
the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996). 
7 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and 
the Self Governing Corporation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
-
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and which make it difficult for shareholders to minimize agency 
costs. If one takes this view, much of corporation law can be 
understood as a solution to one or another of these problems. 
Professor Rock formerly took this approach and, in doing so, was 
clearly not alone . 
Our approach breaches with this tradition. As we discuss below, 
if the four characteristics of the corporate form are ranked in terms 
of their importance, centralized management becomes the first 
rather than the last of the four. This shift has fundamental 
implications for how one understands and teaches corporate law. 
I. THEORIES OF THE FIRM 
A theory of the firm-by describingwhywe have firms, what goes 
on inside firms, and what are the boundaries of the firm-helps us 
identify the key problems that parties to the firm need to solve. A 
theory of the firm can also help us figure out what problems the 
parties are able to solve themselves, how they solve them, and the 
role the law plays in facilitating solutions or in interfering with 
solutions. 
Three competing theories of the firm have been developed and 
refined over the past several decades. While not mutually exclusive, 
each has had different implications for corporate law. For the last 
fifteen years, most scholars who addressed the connection between 
the theory of the firm and corporate law focused primarily on the 
agency cost theories of the firm associated with Alchian and 
Demsetz8 and with Jensen and Meckling.9 Agency cost theories of 
the firm, however, are incomplete in four important dimensions. 
First, they provide no theory of the boundary between the firm and 
the market. Second, agency cost theories provide no explanation of 
the "core" of the firm, that which allows the firm to thrive in 
competitive product markets. Third, at least as applied in corporate 
law, these theories focus too much on the isolated contracting node 
8 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972). 
9 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976). 
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of the firm, failing to place it in the broader operational context in 
which the firm operates. In so doing, the theories fail to identify the 
rea sons that centralized management is central. Finally, they fail 
to differentiate between legally enforceable provisions and non-
legally enforceable norms. 
In the years since Jensen and Meckling, a complementary 
"property rights" approach has been developed, primarily by 
Grossman, Hart and Moore, which helps explicate the firm's "core." 10 
At the same time, over a somewhat longer period, the transaction 
cost theories of the firm , largely associated with Oliver Williamson, 
have focused on the firm-market boundary. 11 In our working paper, 
we set forth a view of the firm that draws on and extends these two 
literatures, and looks at the connection between these property 
rights theories and understanding corporate law. 
We take the firm to be a locus of specific investment in which 
transaction costs are sufficiently high that contractual incomplete-
ness is inevitable. In this picture of the firm, several overlapping 
features emerge as particularly significant. 
First, at the core of the firm are its physical and intangible 
assets. These assets are owned by the firm in that the firm has 
residual control rights and can allow or deny access to them. Many 
of these assets are specific to the firm and, given their uniqueness, 
provide the firm with whatever competitive advantages it enjoys . 
For the corporation to succeed in maximizing free cash flow , it must 
purchase assets required to maintain its competitive advantage 
while shedding those that are not needed. 
Second, employees are given access to selected assets, and many 
make match-investments in the individualized assets with which 
they work. The difference between employees and the outside 
suppliers and customers, who may also work with or around the 
firm's assets, is that the employment relationship is brought inside 
the firm, thereby marking the firm's boundaries. Asymmetry of 
information abounds, primarily but not entirely due to asset 
10 Stanford J . Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 (1986); Oliver Hart & 
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J . POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990). 
11 OLIVER E . WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 29-55 (1975). 
II 
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specificity. This circumstance requires a mechanism that protects 
the corporation's, the suppliers', and the employees' investments in 
match assets. 
Third, the distinguishing feature of the activities brought inside 
the firm is that the intra-firm activities are marked by numerous 
and recurring transactions over an indeterminate period of time. In 
this environment, contracting within the firm is necessarily 
incomplete, with the result that a noncontractual governance 
system must be adopted to protect the integrity of the transactions 
between the employees and the firm (and to a lesser extent between 
the suppliers and customers and the firm). In deciding which assets 
to buy, which employees to assign to specific assets, and which 
relationships to bring inside the firm, the firm relies on centralized 
management. 
Under these conditions, a set of governance problems must be 
solved in order to produce widgets optimally and to maximize the 
free cash flow available to shareholders. First, property 
rights-defined here as the power to determine access to specific 
assets and the residual power of control-must be assigned. Second, 
the potential for opportunism that always arises from investments 
in specific assets must be controlled. This opportunism can arise in 
three different contexts. The critical employee may threaten to 
leave with key information still in his head; the firm may threaten 
to fire a key employee once he has transferred the information in his 
head to the firm; or, finally, controlling shareholders may threaten 
to mistreat non-controlling shareholders. The governance structure, 
while minimizing agency costs, must also solve the operational 
problem of maximizing free cash flow. Taking all this to be true, the 
question becomes what does this tell us, first, about corporate law, 
and, derivatively, about how to teach corporate law? 
II. THE PRINCIPAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW 
In this section, we outline, without fully defending, what we take 
to be the principal implication of the preceding view of the firm for 
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corporate law. This discussion is only a summary. For a full 
defense, we refer people to our working paper.12 
First, relationships within the firm will largely be governed by 
norms rather than law. Here, by "norms," we mean "non-legally 
enforceable rules or standards." In our working paper, we propose 
the acronym NLERS, in order to avoid confusion with the variety of 
other meanings of the term "norm." In relationships governed by 
NLERS, understanding the role of the law is tricky. In an NLERS 
world, the private actors create and enforce most of the rules. One 
must thus explore the extent to which the law facilitates or 
undermines the establishment and maintenance of NLERS 
governance. 
Second, the corporate form itself-typically chosen by both 
publicly held and closely held firms-sets up a remarkably robust, 
"incentive compatible," self-enforcing solution to the problems that 
the firm must solve. This form goes a long way toward creating an 
environment for NLERS governance. 
Because the corporation is a legal person, it can hold property. 
By providing that the business and affairs of the corporation will be 
managed by or under the direction of the board of directors 13 and 
that directors will be elected by the shareholders, 14 the Delaware 
statute creates centralized management. In so doing, it assigns to 
central management the right to determine the optimal asset set 
and the utilization of those assets in order to maximize the corpora-
tion's value. Shareholders vote on extraordinary asset purchases or 
sales and on mergers, but not on the ordinary operating decisions. 
These two features thus define, assign, and centralize the core 
property and control rights. Without these features, firms could not 
succeed. Every type of governance problem would emerge, from 
decisions on how to attract and retain individuals willing to work 
with specific assets, to questions of direction and coordination of the 
work to be done. In fact, however, these problems rarely emerge. 
Instead, the governance system with respect to physical and 
intangible investments works so well that we often neglect to credit 
12 Rock & Wachter, supra note 7. 
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998) 





2000] SELF GOVERNANCE 535 
its accomplishment. By creating the foundations for the firm to 
operate under centralized management, corporate law answers the 
question of who gets to "run" the company. 
The corporate form resolves other governance questions as well. 
By providing the firm with an indefinite term of operations, this 
form solves problems involving opportunism that arise in the last 
period. Because dissolution requires a board resolution and a vote 
of a majority of the shares, individual minority shareholders have 
no power to trigger dissolution. Minority shareholders likewise 
have no right to be bought out because, under the standard 
corporation laws, no shareholder has a general right to be bought 
out. This prevents any individual non-controlling shareholder from 
threatening dissolution in order to increase his share of the surplus. 
Similarly, the corporate form handles potential opportunism by 
the controlling shareholders toward the non-controlling sharehold-
ers . Here the critical mechanism is the prohibition on non-pro-rata 
distributions. Dividends-by definition-must be paid pro rata. 
Upon dissolution, anything left after creditors are paid off is 
distributed pro rata to the shareholders. 15 These terms provide a 
first-order solution to majority opportunism by yoking the interests 
of the controlling shareholder to those of the minority. So long as 
non-pro-rata distributions are prevented, the controlling share-
holder, in maximizing the value of his stake, likewise maximizes the 
value of the minority shares. If the controlling shareholder wants 
to get money out of the firm, minority shareholders receive their cut 
as well, either through dividends or upon dissolution of the firm. 
It is also clear why these terms must be legal terms. The legal 
forms efficiently provide the initial default settings, allowing the 
parties to choose easily between centralized and decentralized 
management. Moreover, once the firm gets started and especially 
in the last period, gains from opportunism can be very large, 
whether in the form of the controlling shareholder stealing from the 
firm or the minority shareholder holding up the controlling share-
holder. Socially acceptable NLERS sanctions may not be sufficiently 
robust to constrain such behavior. 
15 Id. § 281. 
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Finally, on this view of corporate law, fiduciary duties play quite 
an interesting role that is not generally recognized. In understand-
ing the role of fiduciary duties, three goals must be kept in mind. 
First, the key coordinating function served by centralized manage-
ment must be preserved. Second, both minority and majority 
opportunism must be discouraged. Third, the self-governing 
character of the relationship must be preserved. 
III. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
The duty of loyalty is the second half of the prohibition on non-
pro-rata distributions. The first piece, mentioned above, is the 
statutory requirement that dividends be paid out pro rata according 
to the number of shares, with the linked requirement that upon 
dissolution, all shareholders share pro rata. But there are a 
multitude of ways to evade such a rule. The role of the duty of 
loyalty is to provide an ex post check, to prevent enough instances 
of self-dealing from slipping through so that the overall incentive 
compatibility of the form is preserved. The form maintains its 
usefulness if some self-dealing gets through, but not if too much 
does. 
Each of the major aspects of the duty of loyalty blocks one of the 
most obvious modes of siphoning off assets. The limitations on basic 
self-dealing attempt to prevent the grossest sorts of theft, while 
encouraging the use of processes that will preserve enough flexibil-
ity to permit transactions that will benefit the firm. The treatment 
of compensation, similarly, is understood as a judicial attempt to 
prevent the worst sorts of self-dealing, while allowing enough 
flexibility in structuring compensation so as to encourage managers 
to perform well. Finally, the various strands of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine seek to strike a similar balance. 
As such, the role of the duty of loyalty is to provide a check on 
majority opportunism. Because of the gains available to the 
majority from stealing, the check must be legal. But, at the same 
time, the check is constrained. The idea is to keep the controlling 
shareholder in the flock, working for the advantage of the group. 
The law plays the role of sheep dog, but does not intervene beyond 
what is necessary. 
I 
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IV. THE DUTY OF CARE 
From this perspective, the duty of care and the business judg-
ment rule are more remarkable . The duty of care is typically taken 
to be some sort of negligence rule, which is operationalized through 
the business judgment rule. The puzzle posed by the duty of care is 
that if it is a negligence rule, why are findings of negligence so much 
less common than in other cases of professional malpractice?16 
In our view, the difference lies in the context in which the parties 
establish their relationships. Corporate decisionmaking is NLERS-
governed while medical malpractice law and other professional 
malpractice is and typically must be law-governed. To unpack this 
claim, it is useful to proceed in several steps. 
First, medical malpractice in particular, and negligence in 
general, represent the use of legal sanctions to control conduct. 
NLERS governance is unlikely to work in the typical negligence 
context because the interaction among the parties is typically one 
shot, with no opportunity to negotiate terms. In the medical 
malpractice context, while there may be some opportunity to 
negotiate terms, the difference in knowledge between doctor and 
patient, the imperfections of the markets, and the magnitude of the 
harm are such that the opportunity to negotiate terms is limited. 
Again, the stakes are sufficiently high that NLERS are unlikely to 
suffice . 
Directors and shareholders, by contrast, are in a continuous set 
of interactions. As argued above, and discussed in more detail in 
our working paper, the nature of the relationship between the 
parties and the density of match assets are such that it is in just 
such cases that NLERS governance is likely to trump law gover-
nance. Our argument, then, is that the difference between the 
directorial and the medical duty of care is not in the nature of the 
decisions-as Eisenberg suggests 17-but in the nature of the 
relationships among the actors. 
16 For important contributions to this discussion, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 437 (1993); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage 
or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L . REV. 287 (1994). 
17 Eisenberg, supra note 16. 
538 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:529 
From this perspective, the business judgment rule looks strik-
ingly like the employment-at-will doctrine in employment law. It is 
a rule of judicial non-intervention. The boundary ofthe firm is both 
an economic and a jurisdictional boundary. Under the employment-
at-will doctrine, an employer may discharge an employee for good 
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. 18 In other words, the courts 
are unwilling to rule on the reasons for discharge, leaving it to the 
parties to work out. Similarly, in the corporate context, the actual 
standard of review applied by courts to corporate decisionmaking 
can generally be described as no liability for negligent 
decisionmaking absent self-dealing. 
Understood this way, the business judgment rule serves several 
purposes by preventing non-controlling shareholders from complain-
ing to a third party about the business decisions of central manag-
ers. First, intervention by third parties interferes with centralized 
management. Second, the ability to appeal to a third party provides 
a tool that can be used strategically by minority shareholders. 
Third, the ability to appeal to a third party undermines the self-
governing quality of the relationship. As such, the business 
judgment rule is about preserving centralized management, 
preventing minority opportunism, and preserving NLERS gover-
nance. 
V. THE LIMITS OF NLERS SELF GOVERNANCE 
The truly interesting cases are those in which the court refuses 
to apply the business judgment rule because of "gross negligence," 
as in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 19 or because a number of the directors 
fail to satisfy the independence requirement, as in Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor. 20 What are the courts doing when they seem to demand 
that the board follow a particular process or methodology? 
One approach is to view these cases as cases of suspected self-
dealing, in which bad process is viewed as a red flag indicating self-
18 On the employment-at-will doctrine as a jurisdictional rule preserving norm 
governance in the employment relationship, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L . Wachter, The 
Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996). 
19 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
20 634 A.2d 345 (Del.), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
2000] SELF GOVERNANCE 539 
dealing even if there is no good evidence of self dealing in the record. 
Read this way, these cases really become an appendix to the self-
dealing doctrines of the duty ofloyalty. 
The opinions do not read this way, however. In reading either 
Va.n Gorham or Cede, one has little sense that the judges, both on 
the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, 
think that self-dealing is going on. They are offended by something 
else. In the case of Va.n Gorlwm, they seem to be offended by Van 
Gorkom acting in a headstrong, imperious way, pushing through the 
deal without following appropriate process. 21 Similarly, in Cede, the 
Delaware Supreme Court is bothered both by Chancellor Allen's 
analysis and application of the duty of care as a negligence rule, and 
by the presence of a director who received a (disclosed) finder's fee 
in connection with the transaction. 22 
The better reading of these cases is that judicial scrutiny is 
appropriate because selling the company puts the directors into the 
"last period" of play. Like the self-dealing cases, these cases stand 
for the proposition that NLERS self-governance potentially breaks 
down in the last period of play, and therefore the courts have to 
scrutinize the behavior and results carefully (which they call "entire 
fairness" scrutiny). 
VI. THE COURTS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF NLERS: 
STORIES ABOUT SAINTS AND SINNERS 
This analysis brings us to the question of how NLERS are 
transmitted and what role, if any, Delaware judges play in that 
process. The first, and clearly most important, transmission device 
for NLERS is competitive markets. While centralized management 
will, in the first instance, choose the NLERS for the firm, this is 
done against the background of a market check. Beyond competitive 
markets, there are a variety of transmission mechanisms. Business 
schools and consultants play a significant role. Directors who serve 
on more than one board can act to cross-fertilize. Lawyers likewise 
21 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866-69. 
22 Cede, 634 A.2d at 368-69. 
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often see a wide range of variations and develop notions of best 
practice. 
Where do the Delaware judges fit in here? If one takes manage-
ment buyouts (MBOs) of large, publicly held corporations as an 
example, one finds that the use of a special committee, while clearly 
recommended by the Delaware courts-and a largely accepted 
practice-is neither necessary nor sufficient for the validity of the 
transaction. Thus, it seems to be an NLERS. The Delaware courts, 
during the 1980s, played a central role in articulating and encourag-
ing the use of special committees in MBO transactions, often by 
criticizing or complimenting particular lawyers and directors 
without imposing any sanction. 23 
Similarly, Delaware's encouragement of the use of independent 
directors in conflict transactions, although again neither necessary 
nor sufficient, can likewise be understood as an effort to spread the 
emerging best practice. In that context, indeed, the Delaware 
courts' role may be to spread best practice among companies and, 
especially, from large companies to smaller ones. 
In both cases, if the Delaware courts are, indeed, playing a role 
in the transmission of NLERS, they are doing so within a narrow 
compass. The NLERS they encourage are within the scope of 
lawyers' traditional expertise: process-based, institutionally subtle 
governance mechanisms designed to control complicated conflicts of 
interest. Judges typically drawn from the Delaware corporate 
bar-or, when not, rather quickly socialized by those who 
were-occupy an odd sort of insider-outsider position. From years 
of corporate practice, they typically know much about the way the 
corporate world works. But, at the same time, they develop a sense 
of the limitations of the judicial role, especially with respect to 
encouraging excellent management or punishing bad management. 
This perspective puts them in the position of having at least some 
credibility to influence this specialized set of NLERS, especially in 
publicly held corporations, through criticism unaccompanied by 
legal sanction. 
Because they are encouraging the development of NLERS, 
however, these judges do not do so by the straightforward applica-
23 Rock, supra note 1, at 1103-04. 
I 
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tion of legal sanctions. Rather, the possibility of intrusive scrutiny 
provides the incentive for the development or internalization of 
appropriate modes of behavior, coupled with the withering denunci-
ations of self-dealing that courts are capable of delivering. 
Here we find a dual explanation for the peculiar quality of 
Delaware case law. First, the judges are insiders and thus recognize 
and feel confident about condemning bad behavior in strong terms. 
Second, judges function in, and deeply respect, the NLERS self-
governance of the corporation, and thus are reluctant to disturb it. 
Put these two factors together, and you predict vigorous criticism 
unaccompanied by legal sanctions. 
Van Gorkom provides a wonderful case to examine the conflicts 
that can emerge when case law is operating at the boundary 
between legally enforceable and non-legally enforceable rules and 
standards. In finding directors personally liable for selling Trans 
Union at a price far above the pre-deal stock price, but with minimal 
process, 24 the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to expand the 
scope over which it would find violations of the duty of care and 
second-guess corporate decisions. By appearing to have upset the 
balance between self-governance and legal enforceability, the 
decision led to widespread criticism, ending with an amendment to 
the Delaware statute, section 102(b)(7). 25 This amendment, by 
permitting corporations to opt out of liability for breaches of the 
duty of care, re-established the pre-existing structure in which the 
duty of care was almost entirely enforced by non-legal sanctions 
and, when enforced by legal sanctions, by equitable relief. From a 
legal centrist viewpoint, the impact of the case is unclear: the case 
might be understood to have increased the standard of care, but, by 
limiting liability, to have decreased the cost of violations. 
The actual legacy of the case, however, seems to have been quite 
different. Although the court was sketchy in describing the error 
committed by the directors in Van Gorkom, a more deliberate 
process was quickly incorporated into the prevailing NLERS. 
Regardless of whether the court was correct that Van Gorkom and 
the other defendants behaved with gross negligence, the effect of the 
24 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. 
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1998). 
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case seems to have been to improve the quality of boardroom 
decisionmaking in control transactions. If our reasoning is correct, 
the court might well have achieved the same result by describing 
the behavior of the defendants in strongly judgmental tones, while 
holding that the business judgment rule protected the decision. 26 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING THE BASIC COURSE 
If one shares our view of corporate law, how does it affect the way 
one teaches the basic course? There are several implications. 
First, one can spend some time talking about the theories of the 
firm. Why are there firms? What explains the core? What explains 
the boundaries? What are the problems that a firm must solve to 
accomplish its objectives, namely, to achieve some competitive 
advantage? \Vhy do firms choose one particular legal form over 
another? The answers to these questions help anchor the course in 
the competitive market realities that corporations face . 
An agency-centric theory of corporation law has a good deal to say 
but its picture is incomplete and distorted, at least in part because 
directors are not agents of the shareholders in the legal sense. If 
students learn agency theory "too well" in an introductory section, 
they will be puzzled to learn that the business and affairs of the 
corporation are managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors, who, in turn, appoint the executive officers of the 
corporation. Although shareholders get to vote, absent a battle for 
control, they get to vote on very few matters of substance. Upon 
further learning the difficulty that some shareholders face in 
seeking corporate information and in advancing by-law amend-
ments, they might incorrectly conclude that most corporate 
shareholders would prefer to have more power to constrain the 
board than is provided to them under Delaware corporate law. 
Indeed, the great mystery for those who look at corporate law 
through the agency-cost lens is why shareholders, the principals, 
have so little ability to constrain the managers, their agents. If 
26 The settlement ofthe case meant that the Delaware Court of Chancery never returned 
to the question on remand. 
f 
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students interpret the statute as embedding a theory of agency, they 
will either find the statute confusing or the theory mushy. 
Property-rights and transaction cost theories help avoid this 
confusion by introducing the fundamental economic decisions 
corporations face, such as choosing their capital assets and deter-
mining the appropriate scope of vertical integration. Directors and 
their appointed executive officers run the corporation because doing 
so is much more likely to maximize profits. Transaction cost 
theories naturally lead to the conclusion that shareholders, if given 
the choice, would choose the corporate structure that exists in most 
state statutes. Students grounded in the full range of theories ofthe 
firm are more likely to appreciate that it is the requirements of 
centralized management that generate section 141 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law and its progeny, and not some misguided 
failure to appreciate the possibility that managers' interests may 
diverge from those of the shareholders. 
Second, an introduction to alternative organizational forms is 
important. Although it is difficult to find the time in one semester, 
at least a brief introduction to the unique features of partnerships, 
limited partnerships, and close corporations opens the question of 
the environment in which each form is best suited. 
Third, one needs to spend adequate class time on the core 
properties of the corporate form and how the form itself-the 
statutory settings-provides a robust first-order solution to the 
problems that must be solved. As part ofthis study, the comparison 
between the statutory form of the corporation and that of partner-
ship emphasizes more the differences in centralized management 
and exit terms and only secondarily the difference in liability issues. 
Here, in particular, one wants to focus attention on the limitations 
on exit as a means to constrain minority opportunism. One also 
wants to focus attention on the limitations on non-pro-rata distribu-
tions as a means of controlling majority opportunism. However, in 
addition, students need to be chased around the statute, finding the 
statutory provisions that create the legal properties of the form. It 
is not enough for apprentice watchmakers to gaze on a watch with 
wonder; they need to learn how to take it apart and put it back 
together. 
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Fourth, one needs to address the boundary and balance between 
law and norms explicitly. One needs to introduce the concept of 
non-legally enforceable rules or standards, and show that important 
areas of economic activity are effectively governed by NLERS, and 
that, where it works, it is a better mode of governance than legal 
governance. This critical anti-"legal centrist" point is a very hard 
one to get across, especially to second-year law students who are 
imbued with the power and majesty of the law. We are not sure how 
best to make this concept clear to students. A starting point is a 
better appreciation of the role of transaction costs in determining 
which activities are best organized inside the firm and which are 
,best to leave to the market. From this starting point, one can show 
why law works best outside the firm and NLERS governance works 
best inside. 
Once one goes down this route, teaching fiduciary duties actually 
becomes much easier. The duty of loyalty cases are quite straight-
forward on this model: they are a backstop to enforce the statutory 
prohibition on non-pro-rata distributions that creates the beneficial 
lock-in. These cases must be legally enforceable rather than NLERS 
because self-dealing potentially transforms the relationship into a 
"last period" that the weaker NLERS sanctions, many of which 
depend on future interactions, cannot handle. 
The duty of care-business judgment rule cases are more tricky 
and more interesting. The first point that must be made is that the 
business judgment rule is a jurisdictional rule. Here, the compari-
son with the employment-at-will doctrine is useful. Once one sees 
that the function of the business judgment rule is jurisdictional, one 
has an answer for why directorial malpractice looks so very different 
from other forms of professional malpractice. One also gets an 
answer to the question of why there is so little law in the duty of 
care context. The answer is that almost all of the duty of care is 
handled by NLERS. 
At this point, one may want to spend some time talking about 
what the NLERS of the corporation are. The first and most 
important NLERS is "maximize firm value" and its variants. There 
are a myriad of ways that this is enforced, with essentially none of 
them being through the law. Making this point is important 
because it eliminates some of the confusion created by the "for whom 
I 
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is the corporation managed?" cases, and the courts' unwillingness to 
intervene to punish stupid decisions (e.g., Kamin u. American 
Express Co. 27) or to force the managers to profit-maximize. The key 
point here is that NLERS self-governance demands that the judges 
stay out. 
One then gets to the cases exploring the limits of the business 
judgment rule. This examination takes one back to the limits of 
NLERS governance, namely, last periods. Self-dealing is one form 
of last period problem. Sale of the company is another. From this 
approach, what justifies the heightened scrutiny that one finds in 
cases like Van Gorkom and Cede is that, for example, Jerome Van 
Gorkom was in a last period, having decided to retire from the firm. 
On this view, also, the common practice of spending an abun-
dance of time in the basic course on the takeover cases is problem-
atic because the last period problem makes them fundamentally 
different from other duty of care cases, such as Kamin and Joy u. 
North. 28 One can fit the leading takeover cases into the overall 
structure by focusing on this aspect, which helps prevent the 
attempt that students typically make to transfer the doctrines of the 
takeover cases into non-takeover contexts. One can also use these 
cases-specifically the MBO cases in which criticism is leveled but 
often without the imposition of legal sanction-to illustrate the 
phenomenon of judicial participation in the evolution of NLERS. 
Finally, with respect to derivative suits, one returns to the 
business judgment rule as a jurisdictional rule. The demand 
requirement begins to make a fair bit of sense. The question 
addressed by the demand requirement is whether there is reason to 
believe that the preconditions of NLERS self-governance have 
broken down sufficiently that judicial scrutiny is called for, not some 
odd sort of early summary judgment procedure. 
Have we succeeded in transforming the basic course to comport 
with our view of corporate law as a system of norms? No, but this 
may be a start. 
27 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1976). 
28 692 F.2d 880, 897 (2d Cir. 1982). 
